U.S. General Ben Hodges: The Russians Made A Fundamental Mistake

• 4.07.2025, 9:49

The American officer gave an exclusive interview to Charter97.org.

Retired U.S. Lieutenant General, former commander of U.S. Army forces in Europe, and veteran of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Ben Hodges believes that the West should adopt the restoration of Ukraine’s 1991 borders as a strategic objective..

The American officer spoke about this in an exclusive interview with Charter97.org.

— How much does the Israeli-Iranian conflict divert the US Administration's attention and resources from supporting Ukraine?

— The United States is big enough and has enough capabilities to be able to do more than one thing at a time. I think that unfortunately the Trump administration had already begun to turn its back on Ukraine. So, it's not like there were a lot of things that we were sending to Ukraine that are now going somewhere else. I don't believe that. I think this is more a choice by the administration: to focus on the Middle East instead of helping Ukraine or just stopping help for Ukraine. It was declining before we ever did this in Iran.

Yes, of course, there would be some distractions for the national security staff in terms of intellectual energy. But a nation like the United States ought to be able to deal with many things at once. We are still dealing with the Pacific. It's not like we can only do Iran.

— But in terms of, let's say things like Patriot systems?

— The Patriots that are in the area were already either in the Middle East or else they were in the Pacific. It's not like they were Patriots that were going to Ukraine and instead got sent elsewhere. I would not connect them in that way.

— Iran did help Putin in times of need with Shahed drones — why did Putin not help his ally, the Iranian regime, under attack? What could be his calculus in this decision?

— Russia did not help Armenia in their war against Azerbaijan. They did not help Assad before he was overthrown and now they have not helped Iran. So that tells me that either Russia is not a dependable ally when there's trouble or Russia does not have the ability to do anything significant because they are so committed against Ukraine, or a third possibility is that Russia has a sort of strange relationship with Israel. Putin even made the comment that there's 2 million Russian-speaking Israelis. So, perhaps this was an excuse that he was not anxious to do too much that would damage Israel.

— In Belarus, there is much worry now about the upcoming Russian-Belarusian joint military exercise Zapad-2025. Last such exercise, Zapad-2021 became a preparation for the full-scale aggression in Ukraine. What are the things to monitor this time?

— This exercise will give us a chance to watch closely any new capabilities or equipment. It'll give us a chance to see if the Russians are practicing things that they've learned in Ukraine that they might use for another operation. It'll give us a chance to see if they really have a lot of new tanks and artillery and the equipment that they've lost. So, for me, it's a good opportunity. And now, unlike in 2021, everybody is aware and is paying attention to these exercises. We will probably do a better job this time of collecting and analyzing information from the Zapad: probably, the logistics, their ability to move — that'll be something I would really want to watch.

— Is there, theoretically speaking, any potential for threat for Baltic states, let's say Suwalki gap as an aftermath of the exercises Zapad-2025?>

— The Russians are at war with us already. We know and there is no doubt they want to regain control over Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, Moldova — there's no debate about that. What they will be looking for is do they see an opportunity where maybe the US is not committed to NATO or maybe other European countries or Canada are not really committed, not willing to do something.

You could imagine the possibility of some sort of attack into Latvia around Daugavpils, for example, where they might do something and then say, "Okay, do you really want to get into a nuclear war because of this?" If the alliance did not respond, then we have a real problem.

I don't know (unless we are just completely asleep) that they are prepared yet to do something that I believe would fail. I think the alliance would respond. And also Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are much better now than they were four years ago at their own defense. Plus, the battle groups that are there. Plus, NATO air power. I am sure that we would respond immediately. Plus, if Russia was going to attack, they would have to launch huge missile attacks against all of our transportation infrastructure, the airports, the seaports, the rail, because they know that NATO depends on rapid reinforcement. So, I'd never say it's not possible, but I think this is part of preparations for possible future attacks.

— In sum, you would not expect an immediate threat in the upcoming months to the Baltic states? Putin would not dare?

— That's not what I said. They are already at war with us: destruction of undersea infrastructure in the Baltic Sea, assassinations, sabotage. The Russian Air Force flew through Estonian airspace to prevent the Estonians from seizing one of the shadow fleet ships — this kind of stuff goes on all the time. Unless we push back on it, they're going to keep doing it more and more.

I think that's the more likely thing that happens: this incremental sort of aggression, combined with other threats and disinformation. The Kremlin is watching, trying to judge if the US really committed, are the Europeans really committed. We announced 5% of the budget on military spending, but it is going to be a long time before that translates into real capability.

— According to the chief of staff of the Ukrainian Army, General Alexander Syrsky, the Russian army is massively gathering troops to try to force a breakthrough in the strategically important cities of Pokrovsk and Konstantinivka in the province of Donetsk. What are your expectations about that and what are things to watch?

— Did General Syrsky say that Pokrovsk was strategically important, or was that somebody else's?

— General Syrsky mentioned the fact that they gather force to make a breakthrough in the areas of Pokrovsk and Konstantinivka, but he did not use the phrase "strategically important".

— This is a problem. A lot of Western journalists call every freaking little village "strategically important", but they're not. And I think the Russians have been trying to get Pokrovsk for at least 18 months now. And Pokrovsk is only 60 kilometers from Avdiivka, which they took over a year and a half ago.

So, I don't see that they can do anything else other than just keep doing what they're doing: these constant attacks on motorcycles and golf carts and drones to try to overwhelm Ukrainian defenders. But I don't see them having the capability to break through: there is not some big armored formation that can punch a hole and then keep going all the way to Dnipro or to Kyiv. I could be wrong, but they have not demonstrated that they have that ability. That doesn't mean that they won't capture a little village here and there or whatever, but at enormous cost. And for what purpose?

I think that a year from now, unless something changes externally, this war will look a lot like it does right now, the lines will not be much different. There may be some changes, but I don't see big differences. Unless the US and Europe together deliver huge amounts of capability to Ukraine, or if we were to shut down Russia's ability to export oil to India and China by blocking it in the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea (that would cause real problems for Russia), otherwise, I think, we're going to see more of what we're seeing now, including, unfortunately, constant killing of innocent Ukrainians with these attacks.

— If the big picture remains the same, what is Russia's strategy in this conflict? Just keep this war going forever?

— No, I think their strategy is to destroy Ukraine as a state and the idea of Ukraine as a sovereign state — that's been their objective from the beginning. That's why they're not interested in any sort of negotiated outcome.

As long as they think they can achieve their objective, Putin does not care how many casualties they have — a million (it's probably even closer to 2 million when I think about how many were wounded, how many of them would have recovered from their wounds or that are lost forever). The exact numbers are unknown, but regardless — a lot have been killed, but yet Russia has not slowed down what they're doing.

So, it's not casualties that will cause them to do something different. I think they will continue doing what they're doing until they think they have achieved the goal of the destruction of Ukraine as a state. This is why they target cities which are obviously war crimes. Every officer in the Russian military that's anywhere in the chain of command and making decisions to shoot missiles against innocent people — their name, their picture should be public information and everybody should know who they are.

— Just over the course of the last week, the Russian army sent about 114 ballistic missiles, 1,270 drones and 100,000 heavy gliding bombs towards Ukraine. What the West could and should do about these attacks which affect mainly the civilian population?

— Three things. Number one — we should make it clear that it is our strategic objective that Ukraine defeats Russia, that that becomes the policy, and that we provide Ukraine everything they need to defeat Russia, which means to push Russia back to the 1991 borders — that has to be our policy.

Number two, a part of that would be helping to stop Russian air and missile attacks against Ukrainian cities. We do this for Israel, we do it in the Red Sea against the Houthis. Why do we not do it for Ukraine? You don't have to shoot down Russian airplanes (they don't even come into Ukraine airspace), but there are things we could do by providing Ukraine the ability to kill the archers. It's better to kill the archer rather than trying to intercept all the arrows. So, help Ukraine develop the ability to go to where the archer is.

The third thing that we should do is use all of our economic leverage against Russia, stop the export of oil, use frozen Russian assets to pay for all of this, and help Ukraine develop the capability to hit Russian oil and gas infrastructure inside Russia. Because without the revenues from exporting oil then Russia could not keep this war going.

— Putin, as you stated clearly, does not care about the human losses on the Russian side, but what about the Russian population, Russian elites? We are speaking about at the very least one million Russian casualties. It is also clear that the casualties are much higher on the Russian side than on the Ukrainian side. Nobody on the Russian side cares about the casualties?

— I think they care, which is why you don't see too many soldiers recruited from Moscow or St. Petersburg. I think most of the people who go into the army come from other regions. Obviously, they are aware that there would be a negative effect on the population if you had so many casualties and funerals inside Moscow and St. Petersburg. So, they care, but not if the most of the casualties come from outside of the two main population areas.

I don't understand the Russian population, why there hasn't been more pushback. Perhaps, this is not their normal way. I also think that Putin has such a strong internal security apparatus that anybody who might organize protests is already dead or imprisoned.

— They don't care about human lives, but speaking of resources, how long can the Russian economy sustain that level of loss of human power and that intensity of attacking Ukraine from the air?

— I don't know. The Chair of the Russian Central bank said that they're going towards recession, that what they're doing now is not sustainable. But I don't know what that means: is it another year or two more months or five years. My belief is that they are in trouble, and at some point they will become apparent.

And also at some point, the oligarchs, when they start feeling the pain, when they start losing, then I think the pressure on Putin increases. While many of them are still making money, what they had before Russia invaded Ukraine has been damaged. They don't have their flats in London's Belgravia or Mayfair or all the other places where Russians put their money — that's been damaged.

— Where would you see Putin's vulnerabilities?

— You have to wonder, what is the real strategy for Putin's regime to achieve his objective? Just bombing Ukrainian cities every night — that did not work in Germany, it didn't work in Great Britain. Bombing, killing civilians never leads to a conflict's conclusion. It doesn't work.

In fact, it causes people to be more resilient. So, you have to wonder, what does he think is going to happen as long as any European countries are willing to continue providing aid to Ukraine.

I think Russians made the faulty assumption that there is no way Ukraine could last, there's no way the west would intervene. Now, Putin is stuck. His ally Iran is really no help anymore. They do get help from North Korea and China but I don't know how long that lasts. I think that Ukraine has made the decision that if they don't get help from the US, either economically or with material, that they probably will get help from some or most European countries, because Europeans are finally realizing that if Ukraine fails, it will be a catastrophe for the rest of Europe.

If Putin does not change, if they don't resolve the conflict, the future for Russia, I think, will be Ukraine that looks like Israel, meaning constantly at war, constantly improving defense. Every senior Russian officer for the rest of his life will have to look over his shoulder and check under his car every day. Just like the Mossad goes after Hezbollah and Hamas leaders, the GUR (Ukrainian Defence Intelligence) will be doing this inside Russia.

The Ukrainians have demonstrated that every bit of Russia can be touched. With the Operation Spider's Web, they demonstrated that they can touch every square kilometer of Russia: airfields, seaports, infrastructure — there is no safe place. It is going to be constant. Ukraine knows if they stop, they cease to exist. Not every day, not every week, but continuous, unending, until Russia finally stops. I think this is Russia's future, unless they figure out a way to end it and to extract themselves.